Game of threads: Enabling asynchronous poisoning attacks by Sanchez Vicarte, Jose Rodrigo
c© 2019 Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Vicarte
GAME OF THREADS: ENABLING ASYNCHRONOUS POISONING
ATTACKS
BY
JOSE RODRIGO SANCHEZ VICARTE
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2019
Urbana, Illinois
Adviser:
Assistant Professor Christopher W. Fletcher
ABSTRACT
As data sizes continue to grow at an unprecedented rate, machine learning
training is being forced to adopt asynchronous training algorithms to maintain
performance and scalability. In asynchronous training, many threads share
and update the model in a racy fashion to avoid inter-thread synchronization.
This work studies the security implications of these codes by introducing
asynchronous poisoning attacks. Our attack influences training outcome—e.g.,
degrades accuracy or biases the model towards an adversary-specified label—
purely by scheduling asynchronous training threads in a malicious fashion.
Since thread scheduling is outside the protections of modern trusted execution
environments (TEEs), e.g., Intel SGX, our attack bypasses these protections
even when the training set can be verified as correct. To the best of our
knowledge, this represents the first example where a class of applications loses
integrity guarantees, despite being protected by enclave-based TEEs such as
Intel SGX.
We demonstrate both accuracy degradation and model biasing attacks on
the CIFAR-10 image recognition task using ResNet-style DNNs, attacking an
asynchronous training implementation published by PyTorch. We perform
a deeper analysis on a LeNet-style DNN. We also perform proof-of-concept
experiments to validate our assumptions on an SGX-enabled machine. Our
most powerful accuracy degradation attack makes no assumptions about
the underlying training algorithm aside from the algorithm supporting racy
updates, yet is capable of returning a fully trained network back to the
accuracy of an untrained network, or to some accuracy in between based
on attacker-controlled parameters. Our model biasing attack is capable of
biasing the model towards an attacker-chosen label by up to ∼ 2× the label’s
normal prediction rate.
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Modern machine learning is a data hungry affair. It is well understood that a
major reason for the success of deep learning has been the availability of public,
diverse datasets of unprecedented scale, e.g., ImageNet [1]. Correspondingly,
the last decade has seen machine learning model training move from single
CPU to single GPU [2], to multicore CPU [3, 4, 5, 6], to larger distributed
systems [7, 8, 9]. This has presented a major performance engineering
challenge. Core training algorithms such as stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
are inherently sequential, such that cross-node synchronization bottlenecks
the performance of scale-out implementations. As a result, starting with
the seminal Hogwild! [5] algorithm, significant attention has been paid to
developing multi-threaded asynchronous SGD algorithms (A-SGD) [10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 9, 6, 7, 8, 3, 17, 18, 19]. A-SGD leverages the inherent noise in
training to skip inter-thread synchronization while maintaining convergence.
We explore the implications of asynchronous training algorithms on machine
learning model integrity in adversarial settings. Consider a setting such as
machine learning as a service (MLaaS) [20, 21]. In MLaaS, the user submits
training data to an untrusted server, which will train the model on behalf
of the user. Training data is sensitive, thus the user requests that the
server run training inside a hardware-based trusted execution environment
(TEE), such as Intel SGX [19, 22, 23]. To improve performance, users may
run asynchronous variants of SGD inside the TEE, as described above. For
example, the Chiron system [19] implements SGX enclave-based A-SGD where
each enclave implements a thread which asynchronously shares parameters
through a centralized parameter server.
Regardless of training algorithm, TEEs should in theory defeat integrity
attacks given even a supervisor level adversary. For example, Intel SGX
uses a combination of attestation mechanisms and runtime protections to
ensure that only validated data runs within the TEE, and that the attacker
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cannot tamper directly with computation once it starts running [24]. These
mechanisms defeat conventional poisoning attacks [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30],
which attempt to influence model integrity by changing the training set.
1.1 This Work
Despite the apparent safety afforded by TEEs, this work introduces asyn-
chronous poisoning attacks (APAs), which show how integrity attacks are
still possible even when asynchronous training runs within TEEs.1 APAs are
based on two observations. First, due to the use of asynchronous algorithms,
training state is a function of not only initial conditions, e.g., training data,
but also the inherent races taking place between threads. Second, mod-
ern trusted execution technologies allow untrusted code, e.g., the operating
system, to influence races through contention [24, 31], and/or thread schedul-
ing [24]. Combining these two observations, an attacker can change the result
of training by influencing data races in a coordinated, malicious fashion. To
the best of our knowledge, this represents the first example where a class of
applications loses integrity guarantees, even when “bug-free”, despite being
protected by enclave-based TEEs such as Intel SGX.
We demonstrate concrete indiscriminate and focused attacks on an A-
SGD code representative of prior work [5, 8, 7]. In the literature [26], an
indiscriminate attack reduces model accuracy while a focused attack does the
same while additionally biasing the model towards a particular label (a.k.a.
class in a classification setting). Our most powerful indiscriminate attack
makes no assumptions about the underlying training algorithm aside from
the algorithm supporting racy updates, yet is capable of returning a fully
trained network back to the accuracy of an untrained network, or to some
accuracy in between based on attacker-controlled parameters. Our focused
attack makes more assumptions regarding what type of A-SGD is running,
but is capable of more powerful effects, namely biasing the trained model
towards a specific attacker-chosen label, e.g., “classify all spam as not spam”
but not the other way around. The core vulnerability exploited by all of our
APA variants is fundamental to any A-SGD code: namely that per-thread
1The name “asynchronous poisoning attack” is inspired by a related type of integrity
attack during training called a poisoning attack (e.g., [25]).
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model updates can be made asynchronously with respect to updates from
other threads.
Contributions. This work makes the following contributions.
1. We introduce asynchronous poisoning attacks (APAs), whereby an
attacker tampers with machine learning training by influencing data
races in a coordinated, malicious fashion. Because contention is outside
the model for trusted execution, APAs bypass protections offered by
modern TEEs.
2. We design and validate three APA variants—two indiscriminate attacks
and a focused attack—which exploit different aspects of A-SGD.
3. We perform extensive analysis on our attacks on the CIFAR-10 [32]
image recognition task, using ResNet-18 [33]—attacking an A-SGD
implementation published by PyTorch [17]. We also perform proof-of-
concept experiments to validate our assumptions on an SGX-enabled
machine. Depending on attack-controlled parameters, our indiscrimi-
nate attack is capable of returning a converged model to pre-trained
accuracy or to some accuracy in between. We also show how our focused
attack can be used to predictably bias the model towards predicting an
adversary-chosen label by up to 2× the original prediction rate. Lastly,
we perform further analysis on a smaller, LeNet-style, network.
4. We provide an extensive discussion of defenses, ranging from point
defenses to our particular attack variants, to more general defensive
strategies.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives preliminaries.
Chapter 3 gives a threat model and assumptions. Chapter 4 presents our
attacks. Section 4.4 gives a technique to coordinate the attack with the end
of training. Chapter 5 evaluates APAs on asynchronous training. Chapter 6
evaluates the feasibility of APA on an SGX protected implementation. Chap-
ter 7 evaluates our attacks. Chapter 8 presents further analysis on the effects
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of an attack. Chapter 9 studies possible defenses. Chapter 10 gives related
work. Finally Chapter 11 concludes.




2.1 Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is a ubiquitous algorithm for training
machine learning models. See Algorithm 1 for pseudo-code. SGD takes a loss
function (called loss), a training set T , and several other inputs we discuss
below. We focus on the classification problem in supervised learning. Thus
T consists of labeled inputs (x, y) for input x and label y. The goal is to
learn parameters θ that minimize loss(θ, x, y), averaged over inputs-labels in
T . Without loss of generality, we will represent y as a scalar that can take
one of C unique values, where C is the number of labels.
To minimize loss, SGD iteratively updates θ based on a gradient it calculates
for loss, given the current θ and B elements in the training set. B is called a
minibatch.1 Each such update is called a step. Training runs for a number
of epochs E (Line 3), where each epoch is d|T |/Be steps. The epoch count
E and minibatch size B are user-specified. To start each epoch, SGD makes
random samples from T with or without replacement (e.g., by shuffling and
then iterating through T , Line 7). This ensures that each epoch visits each
input once (or a small number of times) and that minibatches are composed
of random inputs, both of which improve accuracy.
Gradient update scaling factors. The gradients g are scaled before being
accumulated into the model state (Line 12). There are several strategies for
deriving the scaling factor [35, 36, 37]. A simple and popular strategy that
achieves state-of-the-art accuracy [38, 39, 33], called learning rate, is shown in
Algorithm 1. Here, a uniform scaling factor α (the learning rate) is multiplied
to g and “decayed” once every D epochs. Thus, the average magnitude of
1When B > 1, SGD is sometimes called minibatch gradient descent. We will use this
term and SGD interchangeably.
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Function: SGD(loss, T, B,E,D, α,R)
Inputs: loss (loss function), T (training set), B (minibatch size), E
(number of epochs per run), D (learning rate decay
frequency), α (learning rate), R (initial conditions, seed)
Outputs: Model parameters θ
1 θ = init(R)
2 α = 0.1 /* learning rate */
3 for e = 0, . . . , E − 1 do
4 if e mod D == 0 then
5 α = α/10.0 /* 10.0 = decay rate, may also be variable */
6 end
7 T = shuffle(T )
8 for b = 0, . . . , (|T |/B)− 1 do
9 mb = T [B ∗ b : B ∗ (b+ 1)] /* sample minibatch */
10 /* Compute gradients, avged over minibatch: */




12 θ = θ − α ∗ g /* update parameters */
13 end
14 end
Algorithm 1: (Minibatch) stochastic gradient descent. For simplicity,
assume B divides |T |.
updates gets smaller as training proceeds.
Finally, the seed R is used to initialize θ. Putting it all together,
SGD(loss, T, B,E,D, α,R) becomes a deterministic function in its inputs.
2.2 Asynchronous SGD (A-SGD)
SGD performance is limited to the parallelism available in the inner loop,
Line 11 in Algorithm 1, which averages gradients over the current minibatch.
To alleviate the performance bottleneck in SGD, high-performance systems
typically implement asynchronous stochastic gradient descent (A-SGD) [5,
8, 3, 9, 17, 19]. A-SGD achieves better scalability by running multiple SGD
instances concurrently, i.e., each processing different minibatches, which work
together to train the same model. In addition to achieving high performance,
prior work has also found A-SGD to result in higher accuracy models than
SGD in some cases, e.g., on deep neural networks [8].
There are two main A-SGD architectures: those based on shared memory
6
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Figure 2.1: SGD (top) does not have stale updates. A-SGD (bottom) does have
stale updates. Each arrow denotes an update. Two arrows running in parallel (for
A-SGD) denote two threads. Function call update(θt) denotes a gradient update
(Algorithm 1, Line 12) using model state θt, or the state after t updates.
systems (e.g., [5, 17, 6, 3]) and those based on distributed systems (e.g.,
[8, 19, 18]). To simplify the presentation, we focus on shared memory-based
systems and evaluate our attack on a shared memory implementation of
Hogwild provided by PyTorch (available online at [17]), which is similar to
Algorithm 1. We further analyze the effects of our attack on a smaller network.
We discuss the implications for our attacks on distributed architectures in
Chapter 9.
In shared memory A-SGD, training starts by spawning a fixed number of
worker threads, each of which is similar to Algorithm 1. Each thread runs at its
own pace. Each thread freely (i.e., without locks) updates a shared copy of the
model parameters θ whenever it reaches Line 12 in Algorithm 1. This implies
that gradient updates will be stale, depending on how threads interleave their
updates. Figure 2.1 shows an example. SGD always performs updates based
on the most up-to-date state. That is, we always have θt = θt−1+update(θt−1).
Depending on the order in which thread updates occur, A-SGD updates are
made to stale model parameters. For example, in the figure the model state
is updated with gradients derived from θ0 twice. Conceptually, this means
training can “overshoot” local optimums by taking “too many steps in right
direction.” Despite this, A-SGD systems still converge despite stale updates
because, in expectation, threads run at similar rates and gradient updates
will be recent [5].
7
2.3 Deep Neural Networks
Our attack relies on A-SGD. While A-SGD is general and can be applied to
different models, we assume A-SGD training deep neural networks (DNNs)
due to their popularity and importance today [7, 8, 16, 19]. A DNN F is a
function:
F (θ, x) = σ(L(θ, x)) ∈ RC
which calculates a probability distribution for x being one of C labels. As
discussed, θ is learned during training. L(θ, x) outputs a C-dimensional
vector of logits where the i-th logit is L(θ, x)i. Each logit is an unscaled value
representing the DNN’s confidence that the input x is associated to each
label. For example, the index for the highest value logit is the label the DNN
believes the input is associated to. Finally, logits are scaled via the softmax
function, denoted σ, whose output is a C-dimensional vector which can be
interpreted as the probability that x is associated to each of the C labels.
2.3.1 Training DNNs
DNNs are nearly all trained via (A-)SGD and backpropagation, the latter
which estimates gradients for θ given a loss function. The details of DNN
training are not important for this paper, but we will use the following abstrac-
tion to explain results. Consider an input, label pair (x, y). Backpropagation
will produce gradients for each parameter in θ that are proportional to:
• σ(L(θ, x))j − 1, for logit j = y
• σ(L(θ, x))j, for other logits j 6= y
Here, we assume the cross entropy loss function, which is popular for clas-
sification tasks. Note that elements output by softmax are positive, and
gradients are subtracted from parameters in Algorithm 1, Line 12.
There are two takeaways. First, correct/incorrect logit gradients have
opposite sign. Gradients for θ will adjust corresponding parameters such
that the magnitude of the correct logit will increase (i.e., when y = j), vice
versa for incorrect logits. Second, gradient magnitudes through each logit
are proportional to those logits’ deviations from expected values out of the
softmax. Note that σ(L(θ, x))j should output 1 if j = y and 0 otherwise.
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Thus, a DNN with perfect accuracy will backpropagate σ(L(θ, x))j − 1 = 0
for logit y and σ(L(θ, x))j = 0 otherwise, as expected. On the other hand,
a perfectly incorrect DNN will backpropagate the largest possible gradients,
σ(L(θ, x))j − 1 = −1 when j = y and σ(L(θ, x))j = 1 otherwise, also as
expected.
2.4 Enclave Execution
Enclave execution, e.g., with Intel SGX [40, 24], protects sensitive applications
from direct introspection or tampering from supervisor software. That is,
the OS, hypervisor and other software is considered the attacker [41, 42,
23, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48]. To use SGX, users partition their applications
into enclaves. Applications “enter” and “exit” enclave code using the SGX
functions EENTER and EEXIT, respectively. While running enclave code,
the application can access a privacy- and integrity-protected region of memory
called the EPC (enclave page cache) which is inaccessible to code outside of
the enclave. This process is bootstrapped by hardware attestation and digital
signatures, which ensure that expected enclave code executes on expected
starting data in the EPC.
Despite providing strong virtual isolation, SGX exposes a rich interface to
the supervisor-level attacker. In particular:
Enclave thread management. Enclaves can be viewed as normal user-level
processes from a task scheduling standpoint [49]. Further, each enclave can
be multi-threaded. This means the OS (attacker) controls when each enclave
thread is paused/resumed, just like normal threads. The OS also implements
enclave system calls (e.g., thread start/stop calls) as well as demand paging
when the enclave incurs a page fault.
Side channel amplification. A microarchitectural side channel is a way
for an attacker to infer information about a victim program based on how
the victim uses hardware resources in the system [50]. Prior work has shown
how SGX exacerbates the side channel problem. In particular, SGX enables
a new side channel known as controlled side channel attacks [51, 47], where
the attacker can learn the victim’s page-granularity memory access pattern
with zero noise. Multiple other works have shown how an attacker can learn
a victim’s access pattern at cache line granularity with very little or, again,
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zero noise [44, 46, 52, 48, 45, 53, 54].
We perform an evaluation of how we exploit these properties on an SGX-




We consider an MLaaS-like or otherwise outsourcing setting, where a user
wishes to offload training to an untrusted multi-tenant cloud [20, 21]. The
user submits an untrained model, e.g., a DNN, and a training set (or part of
a training set) to the server. The code run to train the model is considered
public, e.g., is an open source ML framework like PyTorch [17], which we
attack in our evaluation. The training set submitted by the user and the
resulting trained model parameters are considered private. Thus, to improve
security, the user runs training inside of SGX enclaves, similar to Chiron [19],
OblivML [23] or Myelin [22]. Further, we assume the user runs an A-SGD
algorithm within SGX to improve performance and scalability, similar to
Chiron [19]. We assume the standard SGX attacker, namely the operating
system and other supervisor software (see Section 2.4).
The adversary’s goal is to corrupt/bias the user’s trained model. Enclave
virtual isolation prevents trivial integrity attacks by blocking direct tampering
of thread state, e.g., θ, α, etc., during execution (see Section 2.2). Attestation
of initial program state prevents conventional poisoning attacks that modify
the user-supplied training set (Chapter 10). As discussed in Section 2.4,
the adversary can schedule user threads and can only learn about training
execution through its view, namely microarchitectural side channels, enclave
termination times, system calls, etc.
Augmenting the training set with public data. One of our three attack
variants assumes that part of the training set is known. This is common
practice. For example, the user may augment its proprietary training set with
a large public training set such as ImageNet [1] as this has been shown to
improve accuracy (e.g., [55]). The server can provide this data locally to save
bandwidth. In this case, it is still easy to defeat conventional poisoning attacks
by verifying the integrity of augmented data through enclave attestation,




In this chapter, we provide three concrete variants of asynchronous poisoning
attack (APA). All three attacks leverage how a supervisor-level adversary
can context switch any A-SGD thread on and off the system at any point.
Conceptually, this allows the adversary to craft a malicious gradient update
that it can then apply to training at a later time of its choosing. When a
thread is context switched for the purposes of the attack, we refer to it as an
attack thread.
Context switching is a synchronous event that pauses and (eventually)
resumes the attack thread(s) at a particular instruction. This allows the
attacker to construct different variants of the exploit depending on when
and under what conditions it decides to pause which threads. For example,
the adversary can pause the thread after a specific epoch, after copying the
minibatch but before copying the parameters, etc. (see Algorithm 1).
To explain ideas, we assume the attacker can context switch a thread(s)
when needed for the attack and can terminate training at a time of its choosing.
We evaluate a proof-of-concept on an SGX-enabled machine, and the code
supplied by PyTorch [17], to show that these assumptions are reasonable in
Chapters 5-6.
4.1 Indiscriminate Attack Using Learning Rate
The first attack flavor is when the adversary indiscriminately pauses the
attack thread at any point in the A-SGD loop, but before the learning rate
decays (i.e., in the first D − 1 epochs). Later, after the learning rate decays
one or more times, the adversary re-schedules the attack thread, and that
thread makes an update to θ with a specific stale (large) learning rate.



















Epoch 1 Global Minimum Local 
Minimum
X
Figure 4.1: The learning rate-based indiscriminate attack. (Left) the
sequence of learning rates applied to each update in time. (Right) a
visualization of the error surface. The malicious update and the step it
makes through the error surface are shown in red.
attack thread off the system before the learning rate decays (i.e., when α = 0.1
in Algorithm 1) and waits for multiple decays (e.g., when other threads have
been making updates with α = 0.001), at which point it re-schedules the
attack thread. Figure 4.1 (left) shows the sequence of learning rates that will
be applied on each step across all threads in time. The malicious update
is shown as the red spike in the last epoch. Recall that gradient updates
are accumulated into the model parameters θ in a read-accumulate-write
fashion (Line 12), meaning the incorrect update is applied to the current
model parameters.
After the re-scheduled thread applies a large update, θ will be incorrect
(i.e., no longer converged if the model had converged already) and the loss
function will sharply increase. This process is visualized in Figure 4.1 (right).
Non-attack updates with a small learning rate gradually move the model
closer to a global minimum. An update with a large learning rate causes
the model to overshoot the optimum. This attack can be used to render the
resulting model less effective at its given task—e.g., a spam detector may
classify inputs randomly.
This attack is trivial to perform, as the adversary can simply pause the
attack thread at the start of training and wait. This attack requires that the
A-SGD implementation proceed in training regardless of how many epochs
have been completed by other threads. This assumption holds for large-scale
A-SGD implementations [8] as well as the PyTorch code we attack [17].















Figure 4.2: (Left) Scheduling threads for the stale parameter attack.
Multiple parallel arrows denote multiple threads. (Right) Visualization of
the loss function error surface.
tional malicious updates with the stale learning rate to increase damage done
to the model. Not surprisingly, we find that the more malicious updates, the
more damage dealt (Chapter 7).
4.2 Indiscriminate Attack Using Stale Model
Parameters
The last section presented an attack that uses stale learning rates to apply
large malicious updates. There are forms of SGD that do not use discrete
learning rates (e.g., the adaptive moment optimizer [37]). We now present
a more sophisticated attack that does not rely on learning rate, or any
other assumptions aside from updates being made asynchronously. This
is challenging: without a large learning rate, an attack thread’s parameter
update will have magnitude similar to that of updates made by honest threads.
The premise of A-SGD is that such small stale updates should not cause
long-term accuracy loss.
The key idea enabling the attack is to pathologically schedule threads to
maximize model parameter staleness at the time updates occur. We can do
this with the following attacker strategy, shown graphically in Figure 4.2 (left).
For one or more attack threads (say X attack threads), the attacker schedules
each thread to sample the current model state θt (Algorithm 1, Line 11)
and then pause, i.e., de-schedule. Here θt denotes the model after t updates.
Once all attack threads have sampled θt, the attacker allows each thread
to compute and merge its update into θt (Algorithm 1, Line 12), at which
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point each thread is once again de-scheduled. This means that for X attack
threads, the X-th attack thread performs an update based on model state θt,
to a model at state θt+X−1, and that the average staleness is O(X). If X is
sufficiently large, this sufficiently deviates from expected A-SGD behavior to
cause long-term accuracy loss.
We refer to the above steps as one round. The attacker may perform
multiple rounds to do more damage.
Conceptually, the above strategy emulates the large learning rate attack
from the previous section because it makes the gradient updates of all X attack
threads point in similar directions. This is shown graphically in Figure 4.2
(right). As before, malicious updates are shown as red arrows. A series of
small magnitude updates (one per attack thread) are made that are all a
function of a fixed θt, thus overshooting a global optimum in the loss function
error surface. Note that the direction of all updates should be similar, but
will not be the same because each update uses a distinct minibatch.
This attack is more effective with more attack threads, as increasing the
number of attack threads increases the number of steps that the attacker can
move without the next update being a function of a more recent version of
θ, and as the attacker performs more attack rounds. We evaluate how many
rounds and threads per round are needed to do damage in Chapter 7.
4.3 Focused Attack to Bias Model
While the two previous attack variants decrease model accuracy, they do not
give the attacker a guarantee as to how the damaged model predicts on each
particular label. Ideally, the attacker would like to reliably bias the model
towards predicting a particular attacker-chosen label, for example, to classify
all incoming mail as “not spam” and not the other way around.
We now present such a model biasing attack, commonly referred to as a
focused attack [26]. In our attack, the attacker chooses an attack label that
it will bias the model towards. We will build off of the learning rate-based
indiscriminate attack from Section 4.1. At a high level, the attack is identical
to the attack from Section 4.1, except that the attack thread(s) are paused
after sampling a specific minibatch as opposed to an arbitrary minibatch. As
a result, the malicious update is performed with a high learning rate and
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given a specific attacker-chosen minibatch.
The question is, after which minibatch should the attacker pause the attack
thread? Of potentially independent interest, we show in Chapter 7 that model
bias after an update is proportional to minibatch bias. By minibatch bias, we
mean that the number of images/inputs/etc. in the minibatch is unbalanced.
That is, if a minibatch is biased towards label Y , there are more inputs
mapping to label Y in the minibatch than to other labels. Since minibatch
sampling is a random process, sampling biased minibatches happens naturally
during training.
The next three sections address important questions regarding the attack.
In particular: How can the attacker learn minibatch bias? How frequently
can we expect how much minibatch bias to occur? Why does minibatch bias
result in a biased model?
4.3.1 How does the attacker learn minibatch bias?
Suppose part of the training set is public as discussed in Chapter 3. Then an
attacker can deduce minibatch bias in several ways. In the simplest case, if the
seed used to sample minibatches is not kept private, the attacker can trivially
predict the composition (by label ID) of each minibatch. (For example, the
PyTorch code we attack uses a constant seed [17].) Even if a secure setting, it
may be the case that this seed is left public because the minibatch sampling
distribution is not normally considered sensitive.
Even if the seed is private, the attacker can still learn the minibatch bias
through a variety of memory access pattern-related side channels (Section 2.4).
A-SGD codes, such as the PyTorch code we attack [17], do not shuffle actual
training set data per epoch, but rather instantiate iterators that randomly
sample the training set, to improve performance. When combined with a
partially public training set, this means a thread’s memory access pattern
leaks which training examples are sampled from the public part of the training
data. As discussed in Section 2.4, SGX enables fine-grain/low- or zero-noise
monitoring of memory access pattern-related side channels.
In our proof-of-concept on an SGX-enabled system (Chapter 6), we use
a controlled side channel to learn the page-level access pattern [51]. This
is sufficient to learn minibatch bias for any training set whose elements are
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roughly the size of, or larger than, a 4 kB page. This is often the case.
For example, the CIFAR-10 [32] and “ImagenetLite” [1] training sets have
elements which are 3 kB and 150 kB in size, respectively. We evaluate our
proof-of-concept assuming CIFAR-10.
4.3.2 Minibatch bias likelihood
We find that sufficiently biased minibatches appear with high (> 99%) prob-
ability. We define the % bias towards an attack label as the number of
inputs M with that label, divided by the batch size. Continuing our example,
CIFAR-10 has C = 10 labels and has an equal number of inputs for each class,
so % bias in expectation is 10%. We show in our evaluation (Chapter 7) that
a minibatch with ≥ 20% bias is sufficient for an attack. Figure 4.3a shows
the probability of seeing at least one minibatch that is biased by at least a
certain %, given parameters from CIFAR-10 [32], noting that the probability
of the next minibatch having a M/B ∗ 100% bias is given by the binomial
distribution Binom(M ;B, 1
C
) when A-SGD threads sample the minibatch via
random reads,1 and assuming each label is equally common in the training
set. Reading the graph, we see that minibatch sizes B = 64 and B = 128
will both achieve the 20% bias threshold with overwhelming probability, and
note that these are common batch sizes in the wild. For example, Chiron
evaluates CIFAR-10 and ImagenetLite using a 128- and 64- sized minibatch,
respectively [19].
4.3.3 Attack root cause
Why does updating the model with a biased minibatch bias the model? We
will explain the root cause using DNN training as an example. First, the sign
and magnitude of gradients through each logit depend on the correct label
for each input (Section 2.3.1). Second, gradients are averaged across inputs
in each minibatch (Algorithm 1, Line 11). Suppose the entire minibatch
consisted of inputs from a single label. Then clearly the network will bias
towards that label: for each logit i, the gradient for logit i will have the
1That is, with replacement. We note that for practical parameters, this closely approxi-
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(b) Expected number of minibatches with bias %
≥M/B.
Figure 4.3: Statistics on minibatch biasing. Parameters match CIFAR-10 [32]
which we evaluate in Chapter 7. CIFAR-10 has 50,000 inputs and C = 10 labels.
We vary minibatch size B in a range explored by prior works targeting CIFAR-10.
Following state-of-the-art results, we decay the learning rate after 200 epochs [39].
Likelihoods only include minibatches sampled before the learning rate decays the
first time.
same sign across all inputs in the minibatch. Averaging many values sharing
the same sign cannot flip the sign. When the minibatch is not 100% biased,
seeing this effect depends on the magnitudes of logit gradients, but is still
more likely given a more biased minibatch. Putting it all together, we find
that even a slight minibatch bias can bias the overall model because that bias
is amplified with a large (stale) learning rate.
4.3.4 Extending to multiple attack threads
The prior attack variants (Sections 4.1-4.2) gave the attacker the ability to
amplify the attack’s effect by engaging more attack threads, having attack
threads perform multiple malicious updates, etc. Is there a similar mechanism
for the focused attack? The subtlety is that multiple malicious updates should




1 2 3 4
Figure 4.4: Training loss before and after the attack thread commits an
update.
means the strategy used for multiple malicious updates in Section 4.1 will
not work: when the attack thread performs its update, the next minibatch it
samples will not be biased in the same way with high probability.
We avoid this problem by using multiple attack threads. In this case, the
attacker listens for biased minibatches in two or more attack threads. When
it sees a minibatch biased towards the desired target label, it pauses that
thread, repeating this process for the desired number of attack threads. Then,
at the end of training, both threads are released serially to perform their
updates one after another. Note that no two minibatches will contain the
same set of images, but two minibatches with the same bias towards the same
label do occur.
We use a strategy with two attack threads in Chapter 7, and one attack
thread in Chapter 8.
4.4 Coordination with the End of Training
When a malicious update(s) is made, the A-SGD loss function will either
diverge (never recover) or slowly recover over time as non-malicious training
is allowed to proceed. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Loss decreases À until
the attack update Á, at which point loss spikes and begins to fall again Â,
re-converging at some later point Ã.
Thus, a basic function every attack needs is a way to coordinate malicious
updates with the end of training. Else, the model will simply recover by the
time training ends and the attack may as well not have occurred. How the
attacker coordinates the attack with the end of training depends heavily on
the A-SGD implementation. We discuss how this can be done with a C-based




This chapter describes the methodology for APA proof-of-concept codes and
attacks we describe in our evaluation (Chapters 6-7). Unfortunately, despite
recent work on ML in SGX [56, 19], there are currently no publicly available
end-to-end A-SGD frameworks implemented under SGX. Thus, we evaluate
two codes:
• A C-based prototype we designed, run on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
6700K SGX-enabled CPU.
• A PyTorch example A-SGD code which is downloadable from the
PyTorch site [17].
The C-based prototype mimics the main operations in the PyTorch code
(e.g., how minibatch sampling occurs), but does not have all the functionality
needed to produce a high-accuracy model (e.g., gradient calculation, back-
propagation). Thus, its purpose is to evaluate hardware assumptions in an
SGX-enabled environment. The PyTorch-based code’s purpose is to show
how APA attacks can actually degrade training accuracy in a real training
session. We expect codes like the PyTorch implementation to be able to
run on SGX-enabled machines in the future, using library and environment
support such as Haven [57] or Graphene [58]. Both codes are Hogwild!-style
A-SGD algorithms that follow closely to Algorithm 1. We now discuss relevant
details for both codes:
C-based code overview: The C-based code’s computation is shown in
Figure 5.1. A main thread calls EENTER to initialize a blank DNN model
(À) with randomly initialized weights that live in the SGX EPC (the SGX-
protected memory region). Either enclave or non-enclave code loads the
training dataset, alongside a per-element signed hash, into non-enclave mem-
ory (Á).1 The training dataset/model live at public (OS-known) addresses in
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Figure 5.1: Sketch of our SGX-based prototype. Illustrates key operations
for executing an APA on Asynchronous Training.
program memory/EPC, respectively. Main calls pthread create to spawn
A-SGD threads (Â), each of which call EENTER to run code implementing
Lines 3-14 in Algorithm 1 and join when the algorithm terminates.
PyTorch-based code overview: The experiments on PyTorch use the code
hosted at [17]. The only change we make to the PyTorch code is to add
learning rate decay (Ã), which we implement using PyTorch’s built-in learning
rate scheduler functionality. Relative to the C-based code, the PyTorch code
spawns A-SGD threads as full-blown processes (Â) which join in the same
way as the C-based code.
The two most relevant parts of the A-SGD codes for our attacks are how
minibatch sampling occurs (for the focused attack; Section 4.3) and how
training terminates (Section 4.4), discussed in more detail below.
Minibatch sampling (C and PyTorch): At the beginning of each training
epoch, the PyTorch code “shuffles” the dataset by generating a fresh iterator
of permuted indices (Ä), and copying a subset of the dataset according to the
iterator into a local tensor (Å). Our C-based code emulates this by indexing
prevent trivial poisoning attacks. SGX EPC memory is not currently large enough to store
the datasets we evaluate in Chapter 7 (although this issue will be fixed in SGX V2 [19]).
Which implementation is used does not impact the attack.
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randomly into the dataset and performing a memcpy to a private buffer. As
in [19], data is thus streamed into the enclave. As discussed in Section 4.3,
the attacker needs to observe which inputs are sampled for each minibatch to
determine minibatch bias. The PyTorch code uses a public seed to generate
each iterator, making it trivial to learn bias (as the attacker can determine
the bias of each minibatch before training begins). It is reasonable to assume
a real SGX-based training would make the seed private, e.g., by sampling the
seed through the Intel RDRAND instruction. Thus, our evaluation on SGX
learns minibatch bias through side channels (Chapter 6).
Terminating training (C and PyTorch): To disambiguate between an
A-SGD thread and hardware thread, we refer to an A-SGD thread as a worker
in this discussion. Both the C-based and PyTorch code terminate with a
worker join, followed by an operation which copies the trained model to a
secure channel.
In our evaluations (Chapter 7), non-attack workers are allowed to terminate
normally once the learning rate fully decays (loop at Ã). Attack workers,
on the other hand, are prematurely terminated immediately after making
their last malicious update. In the PyTorch code, since each worker is a
separate process, terminating a worker can be done by calling SIGTERM on
the worker. Since other non-attack threads are waiting at a join, this creates a
leaked semaphore warning which the OS (attacker) can mask, at which point
other threads terminate normally and the attack succeeds. In the C-based
prototype, using SIGTERM in this way works in the same fashion assuming
the A-SGD implementation has implemented a handler for clean enclave exits
on thread termination, which follows previous A-SGD implementations (e.g.,
Project Adam [8]) to implement fault tolerance.
5.1 Target Model, Training Dataset and Parameters
We perform all experiments using the CIFAR-10 [32] dataset. We evaluate
on two models, the ResNet-18 [33] CNN in Chapter 7, and a LeNet [59] style
model in Chapter 8.
Dataset. CIFAR-10 is a popular image recognition task with C = 10 labels,
50 K training inputs and 10 K test inputs ranging from animals to vehicles.
We note that the test and training sets are evenly distributed by each label.
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Model under attack. The ResNet-18 [33] model is a CNN with 18 con-
volutional layers, plus additional fully connected and shortcut layers. The
LeNet-based model is a convolutional neural network (CNN) with two convo-
lutional layers and three fully connected layers [59].
Training parameters. We use a minibatch size B = 128 on both networks,
similar to [19], but note that a minibatch size of B = 64 yielded similar
accuracy results. For the ResNet model, the learning rate starts at 0.1 and is
also decayed by a factor of 10 once at epoch 150 and again at epoch 250. We
assume the model has converged, and perform the attack, at epoch 350—after
the learning rate has decayed the last time. For the LeNet model, the learning
rate starts at 0.1 and is manually decayed by a factor of 10 (as in Algorithm 1)
once every 350 epochs, where each epoch is 390 minibatches. We assume the
model has converged, and perform the attack, after 390 epochs—also after
the learning rate has decayed the last time. We note that learning rate decay
schedule is typically public (e.g., a constant as in Algorithm 1). The network
converges to a maximum accuracy of 90% on the validation set when run on




In this chapter, we test key hardware assumptions for our attack on an SGX-
enabled machine and our C-based prototype (Chapter 5). We validate the
assumptions for the focused attack in Section 4.3. The techniques required
validate the indiscriminate attack variants (Sections 4.1-4.2) by extension.
To start, workers (hardware threads) are set up to page fault on the model
(Æ) and on the training dataset (Ä). Using a modified (malicious) page fault
handler in kernel space, we halt workers by not returning control until specific
conditions are met.
On spawn, all but the last worker are halted on their first page miss on
the model (Æ). The remaining worker is used as the attack worker. Page
faults are induced for this worker by clearing page table present bits from all
images in CIFAR-10 that belong to a specific attack label after. Counting the
number of page faults to these images reveals the number of images of the
target class in the batch, which reveals the minibatch bias (Section 4.3). The
batch is known to be biased once the number of images crosses a threshold.1
All other threads are resumed at this point. The page fault handler delays
returning from the most recent page fault to the attack worker, until the
resumed workers terminate. The attack worker learning rate is therefore stale
relative to the rest of the workers. Finally, the attacker lets the attack thread
apply this stale learning rate to the model, and then sends the SIGTERM as
described in Chapter 5 and the APA has been successfully orchestrated.
1One subtlety is that we must detect when minibatch sampling is complete for each
iteration. For this, we arrange for page faults to occur on the model, which is only accessed
after a complete batch is sampled. At this point, bias counters are reset and the attacker




We now evaluate our APAs from Chapter 4 on a real dataset, DNNs and
A-SGD implementation from PyTorch [17] on ResNet. See Chapter 5 for
details on training dataset and model under attack (CIFAR-10 [32] and
ResNet-18 [33]).
7.1 Performing the Attack
We first trained the Resnet model using the PyTorch script until it converged
and then checkpointed the model state. For each plot, we load the checkpoint
and launch an attack thread(s) from the PyTorch code to directly perform the
malicious updates needed to implement each attack variant. For the focused
attack (Section 4.3), we add code to each thread so that updates only trigger
when a minibatch has a specific % bias. This is functionally equivalent to the
proof-of-concept using thread scheduling, side channels, etc., from Chapter 6,
but allows us to perform many experiments in an automated fashion. The
attack has been fully implemented and verified, as described below.
Real OS-Based attack details. We perform live attacks on an Intel(R)
Xeon(R) Gold 6148 CPU (40 cores, 80 threads), attacking the multi-threaded
A-SGD code provided by PyTorch [17]. We made the following changes to
the PyTorch code: we (a) added dataset augmentation, (b) added a learning
rate decay schedule, (c) modified the master thread to periodically check
validation set accuracy to decide when to stop training. We made no changes
to the training logic in each worker thread. In this attack, we emulate a
supervisor-level adversary using a userspace daemon that receives notifications
from A-SGD threads when certain events occur. Specifically (for the focused
attack; Section 4.3): if a thread samples a minibatch with a specified bias
to a specific attack label, the daemon gets a notification and pauses that
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thread until the attack takes place. This functionally emulates the controlled
side channel attack we need from Section 4.3.1, without adding additional
assumptions since controlled side channel attacks can be run with zero-noise.
Prediction rate. To show accuracy change in greater detail, we measure
validation set prediction rate for each label. The CIFAR-10 validation set has
10% images in each class/label, so the baseline unbiased network should have
a prediction rate of 10% on average for each label. Lower/higher prediction
rates than 10% for a given label indicate the model is biased against/towards
those labels.
7.2 Indiscriminate Attacks
Figures 7.1 (a) and (b) show the prediction rate after one and three malicious
updates of the learning rate-based indiscriminate attack (Section 4.1). Each
graph shows one representative run; others were similar. Here, time on the
x-axis is in terms of the number of updates in the thousands. The attack
occurs between time 4 and 6 in Figures 7.1 (a) and (b), respectively. Each
attack uses a minibatch with no bias, i.e., there are an equal 10% of images
from each label. Note the different scales on the y-axis for both figures. The
takeaway is that in both cases, the malicious update impacts prediction rate.
With three malicious updates, the effect is significantly greater (from ∼ 1%
to ∼ 10%).
Figures 7.1 (c) shows model accuracy after launching the stale model
parameters attack (Section 4.2), varying the number of attack threads and
attack rounds (stages). All malicious updates are made with the same (fully
decayed) learning rate as updates made by non-attack threads. Results are
the average accuracy loss taken from 50 runs of each configuration. The
takeaway is that for a given number of attack stages, the more attack threads
involved, the more damage. Further, as the number of stages increases, the
damage increases. This is intuitively what the attacker would like to see.
Note that it is trivial for the attacker to add a specific number of attack
stages: in our configuration training runs for 350 epochs which equates to
over 100,000 updates per thread—and each update could be turned into an
attack stage. How many threads the attacker can leverage depends on the
A-SGD system and how many threads are launched. Thus, in the event that
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Figure 7.1: Indiscriminate attack results. (a) and (b) Prediction rates for the
learning rate-based attack (Section 4.1) after 1 and 3 malicious updates. Time on
the x-axis is in terms of updates in the thousands. The dashed line represents the
point at which the attack starts. (c) Network accuracy for the stale
parameter-based indiscriminate attack (Section 4.2) for varying numbers of attack
threads and attack rounds.
fewer threads are running, the attacker can use more attack stages to do
damage. For example, 21 attack rounds starts to do damage given 60 threads,
while 4 rounds is sufficient to do significant damage with 300 threads.
7.3 Focused Attacks
Figure 7.2 shows the effect of focused attacks on representative attack labels
(Section 4.3), averaged over 50 runs and starting from the same initial model
state. All experiments show the impact on prediction rate after two attack
threads make malicious updates (Section 4.3.4). With one attack thread, the
accuracy drop is smaller (on order 1-3%), which we omit showing for space.
Recall that 10% bias is an indiscriminate attack and we do not expect to
see bias in that case. Thus, we show intermediate bias points 17%, 20%, 30%
and 100%. Although a 100% biased minibatch will not occur in practice, we
show it for reference and to emphasize how greater minibatch bias implies
greater model bias.
The takeaway is that in most cases the attack biases the model, as desired.
Consider attack label 0: with two 20% biased updates, the model biases with
a 22-23% prediction rate towards label 0. Attack label 4 behaves similarly.
We did observe that the attack is more difficult to control with multiple
attack threads. For example, the effect is predictable for 17%, 20% and
100% biased minibatches, but actually decreases bias towards label 0 given a
30% bias. There are other cases where, although bias does shift in the right
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Figure 7.2: Focused attack results (Section 4.3) for ResNet, using two malicious
updates (with two attack threads; c.f. Section 4.3.4). Note the difference in scale
for each graph. Time on the x-axis is given in seconds since the start of training.
The dotted line in each graph indicates the point at which the attack started.
direction, the attack label is not the most biased label (e.g., attack label 1).
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS OF ATTACK EFFECTS
We now present analysis of our APAs from Chapter 4 on a smaller DNN
than ResNet. We perform a deeper analysis and present some intuition on
attack effects. Furthermore, we allow the network some recovery time after
the attack and present analysis.
8.1 Methodology
We analyze our attacks on a LeNet [59] style model. We solely evaluate LeNet
using the synthetic methodology from Section 7.1. Notably, this methodology
also allows us to explain results in a noise-free environment on this simple
DNN. Although the methodology remains the same, the LeNet evaluation is
performed using a Tensorflow model.
LeNet Style Network. The learning rate starts at 0.1 and is manually
decayed by a factor of 10 (as in Algorithm 1) once every 350 epochs, where
each epoch is 390 minibatches. We perform attacks after the learning rate
has decayed 6 times. We chose these parameters to be representative of prior
work on CIFAR-10. This model converges to a validation accuracy of 86%.
Label tolerance. In order to further analyze attack effects, we analyze
both prediction rates and label tolerances. Tolerance refers to the difference
in confidence between the correct label and some other label, and provides
intuition on the model’s susceptibility to miss-classifications. Suppose the set
of test inputs with true label y is given by V y and the i-th input in this set is










where L(θ, x) is the model output in logits, defined in Section 2.3. That is,
indiscriminate tolerance is the difference in confidence between the correct
label y and the highest confidence label, averaged over inputs in the test set
belonging to label y. When the model mislabels on average, Ty(θ) is negative.
This intuitively tells us how correct or incorrect the model is w.r.t. inputs
labeled y. We report results in logits, not probabilities output from softmax,
because probabilities are correlated across the labels, which complicates the
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In words, focused tolerance is the average difference in confidence between
the correct label and a specific label j. We will drop θ from Ty(θ), i.e., Ty,
for short.
8.2 Indiscriminate Attacks
Figure 8.1 shows the effect of our learning rate-based indiscriminate attack
on LeNet (Flavor 1; Section 4.1). All results apply an update using the first
learning rate 0.1, when the other threads have switched to the final learning
rate. The left graph shows indiscriminate tolerance averaged over 55 random
indiscriminate attacks across 55 different runs. The right graph shows a single
representative attack, in terms of the likelihood that the model predicts to
each class.
The effect on tolerance is relatively consistent across runs: when the attack
occurs at update 880 K, indiscriminate tolerance suddenly drops for all labels
and then begins to recover. We see this has a large effect on model prediction
rate in the right figure. We find that across different attacks, indiscriminate
tolerance predictably drops; however, the effect in terms of prediction accuracy
is unpredictable. For example, in this case the model becomes biased towards
label 5. In another example, it may become biased towards another label.
Importantly, we see that the inputs for most labels recover at a similar rate.
For example, by 940 K steps, all labels are predicted 10%± 5% of the time.
We perform further forensics on the attack in Figure 8.2, which shows the
distribution of gradients (not learning rate times gradients) in θ after each
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Figure 8.1: Indiscriminate attacks (Flavor 1; Section 4.1) on LeNet. The left
graph shows indiscriminate tolerance, averaged over 55 runs. Tolerance below the
dashed line (zero) means the model is mislabeling inputs. Each line represents
indiscriminate tolerance Ti for inputs assigned to a specific label. The right graph
shows prediction rate per label on the test set for a representative run.
update from start to finish in training. We show the two convolutional and
first two fully connected layers in the DNN. This shows why the attack has a
dramatic effect. Because the attack thread applies an element-wise update
to θ, it places all parameters in θ in a bad state. As a result, gradients for
subsequent updates are large in every DNN layer. Interestingly, the gradient
distribution after the attack is more pronounced than the distribution at the
start of training.
8.3 Focused Attacks on LeNet
Results for our focused attack on LeNet (Flavor 2; Section 4.3) are shown in
Figure 8.3. We explored two dimensions: different attack labels and, for each
attack label, different degrees of minibatch bias. Each row of graphs shows
a different attack label. Each column shows a different minibatch bias for
that attack label. Bias is defined in Section 4.3. As with the indiscriminate
attack result, we show results in terms of tolerance (left three columns) and
prediction rate (right two columns). Each line in each tolerance graph shows
focused tolerance between one of the non-attack labels and the attack label.
We show results for attack labels 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9 as they are representative.
All results apply an update using the first learning rate 0.1.
Since CIFAR-10 has C = 10 labels, 10% bias means unbiased. The
probability of seeing each degree of bias for B = 128 and D = 200 is given
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Figure 8.2: Gradient distribution from start to finish in training, for LeNet.
in Figure 4.3.1 Specifically, there is a > 99% chance to see a 20% biased
minibatch batch and a ∼ .001% chance to see a 30% biased minibatch. We
show both to demonstrate the effect, and note that 30% bias is likely to occur
with a smaller batch size, e.g., B = 64 (Figure 4.3).
The takeaway is that, regardless of the attack label, we see clear model
bias towards the attack label by the 30% minibatch bias point. Further,
minibatches biased as little as 20% cause the model to noticeably bias in the
direction of the attack label (for labels 2, 3 and 8). Interestingly, we find
that some labels never fully recover. For example, in T5,3 (20% bias) label 5
re-converges with significantly lower tolerance towards label 3 than before
the attack. Finally, we see that a 10% minibatch bias is not sufficient to bias
the model towards the attack label, which is expected because 10% is the
per-label bias in expectation for CIFAR-10. (We do not show the prediction
rates for the 10% bias case because they behave the same as indiscriminate
attacks.) To summarize, this result shows how an adversary can perform
focused damage, across most attack labels, using stale minibatches that are
likely to appear in a real training session.
Effect of focused attacks on non-attack labels. An important question
is: if we bias the model towards attack label i, will its tolerance also bias
towards other labels j for i 6= j? We find the answer is no. Figure 8.4 shows
1This means the probabilities are slightly higher in our evaluation since we use D = 350.
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a representative result for a 20% biased minibatch. This figure depicts the
tolerance to label 7. In this case, the attack label is label 2. We see tolerance
to label 7 changes only slightly except for label 2, as desired. This corresponds
to Figure 8.3, second row, second column: Ti,2 shows clear bias towards the
attack label.
8.4 Stale Parameters Indiscriminate Attacks on LeNet
Results for our stale parameters indiscriminate attack (Flavor 3; Section 4.2)
are shown in Figure 8.5. In this experiment, all model threads have a small
(fully decayed) learning rate and, for a given graph, all threads participate
in a single round. As discussed in Section 4.2, the effect on the network
increases proportionally to the number of threads. For example, applying 8
or 16 attack threads (Section 4.3) can noticeably degrade model accuracy.
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Figure 8.3: Focused attack results for LeNet, using the Flavor 2 attack from
Section 4.3, using a single malicious update. The left three columns show focused
tolerance towards the given attack label. Tolerance below the dashed line (zero)
means the model is miss-labeling inputs. Ti,2 means this graph will give confidence
differences from each label i = 0, . . . , C − 1, for i 6= 2, to label 2. That is, it shows
every input’s bias towards label 2. We do not show Ti,i: the tolerance of label i to
itself is 0 (see dashed line). The right two columns show prediction rate per label
for the corresponding attack labels. The dotted curve represents the attack label
prediction rate.
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Figure 8.4: Tolerance to non-attack label 7, from attack label 1 and a 20% biased
minibatch. Conventions follow Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.5: Flavor 3 attacks on LeNet. The y-axis is the same as in Figure 8.1:




We now review possible defense approaches against asynchronous poisoning
attacks (APA). The root cause of these attacks is malicious thread scheduling
to influence model state. We proposed three concrete APAs, based on stale
learning rate and stale model parameters, however others are likely possible.
We will discuss both specific mitigations to specific attacks and more general
defense approaches.
Restricting thread scheduling/staleness. One direction to aggravate
(and sometimes mitigate) our attacks is to disallow certain thread schedulings.
Specifically, to mitigate our learning rate-based attacks (Sections 4.1 and 4.3)
in the shared memory model, we recommend synchronizing worker threads at
a coarse granularity, e.g., epoch granularity. Mitigating our stale parameter-
based attack (Section 4.2) seems more challenging, which does not require
de-scheduling threads for long amounts of time.
Beyond our setting, restricting thread staleness is an important technique
to improve A-SGD convergence rates [60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68].
Importantly, techniques designed not for APA are only partially (or not)
effective on APA. For example, [63] proposes restarting a thread’s inner loop
if it has not made an update for > M updates made by other threads (where
M is configurable). This is not effective at mitigating our learning rate-based
attacks—restarting the inner loop does not decay rate. This attack can be
effective at mitigating the stale parameters-based attack if the number of
attack threads is > M , but this parameter would need to be carefully tuned
with guidance from our analysis (Chapter 7).
Byzantine A-SGD. Byzantine works, such as [69, 70, 71], develop methods
to protect training from a bounded number of malicious or faulty workers.
A basic limitation in byzantine approaches is that they assume a threshold
on the number of malicious worker threads. An SGX attacker can corrupt
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more or even all worker threads for arbitrary periods of time, violating
byzantine assumptions. Further, arbitrary adversarial thread scheduling
allows an attacker to side-step the assumptions made by individual schemes.
For example, [70] do not consider stale model parameter-based attacks in
their threat model (Section 4.2).
A-SGD Design Decisions. The popularization of A-SGD has led to the
development of various frameworks. We highlight some popular architectural
features which help aggravate APA as a side effect. First, some frameworks [8,
67, 72, 60, 19, 61, 73] keep the learning rate on dedicated parameter servers,
which keeps it out of the adversary’s control. This defeats our learning rate
based attack, as pausing the parameter server would cause all of training to
pause. A notable exception is the SGX-based A-SGD framework Chiron [19],
which opts to keep the learning rate local to worker threads, to minimize
parameter server computation. Thus, Chiron is still susceptible to all proposed
variants of APA.
Many of the above systems propose multiple parameter servers for load
balancing, fault tolerance, etc. If the learning rate is stored locally in that
case, the attack may still go through. For example, if when pausing one
parameter server others are allowed to continue, this is akin to pausing a
worker thread with a high learning rate. We leave investigating this direction
as future work.
All of the above systems remain vulnerable to a stale parameters based
attack. Furthermore, there is a recent line of work that tries to replace
centralized parameter servers with peer-to-peer communication to remove
bottlenecks [74]. This approach is, once again, susceptible to learning rate-
based attacks.
Defending against specific attack components. Finally, there are spot
mitigations to specific (not fundamental) parts of various APAs, which are
unlikely to fully quell the vulnerabilities and/or can lead to significant perfor-
mance overhead. For example, we chose controlled side channels to observe
biased minibatches for simplicity, and there are known mitigations (e.g.,
T-SGX [75]) to block these channels. Yet, even without controlled side chan-
nels, there are many low-noise side channels available to the SGX attacker
(Section 2.4). Alternatively, the user can perform an oblivious sort over both
the private and public components of the training set. Unfortunately, this is
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likely to incur huge overhead: oblivious sort with low hidden constants costs
n log2 n oblivious swaps where n in modern datasets can be in the hundreds
of GB [1]. We note that using an alternative iterator to index into unsorted




Asynchronous stochastic gradient descent. Stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) has become ubiquitous in modern machine learning training, and
asynchronous SGD (A-SGD) has become a key tool for scaling SGD to
larger data sizes. Starting with Hogwild! [5], there has been significant
work to analyze the statistical [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] and/or machine
efficiency [9, 6, 7, 8, 3] of A-SGD. Originally, A-SGD was designed to train
sparse, convex problems. Recent work shows how A-SGD can be applied to
non-convex error surfaces and therefore deep learning (DNN) problems like
those studied in this paper [16, 8, 7]. In particular, Google’s Downpour [7]
and Microsoft’s Project Adam [8] both give large-scale exemplar systems
that demonstrate how 10s to 1000s of CPUs running A-SGD can outperform
GPU-based DNN training. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the
first to investigate the security implications of A-SGD.
Cyclades [13] is a framework aimed at minimizing conflicts on shared
memory. Cyclades targets sparse datasets due to how it splits and allocates
updates. When used on a dense dataset, Cyclades must partition updates so
each parameter in the network is accumulated individually. As such, Cyclades
is not suitable for the classification tasks analyzed in this work (DNNs are
dense during training). Although implementing the strong synchronization
presented in Cyclades can defeat some variants of APAs, they come at a much
larger performance cost than the other related works discussed.
In the A-SGD literature, the closest work to that presented here is [76].
That work discusses how an adversary can slow convergence by influencing
scheduling. That work does not discuss targeted damage, nor does it consider
a scenario where an adversary is seeking to damage the final accuracy of a
model; it seeks only to study denial-of-service attacks. Our work influences
scheduling to influence the integrity of the model.
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Poisoning attacks. Poisoning attacks are a related attack on model integrity
at training time [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Unlike our attacks, conventional
poisoning attacks assume a crowd-sourced setting, where many parties con-
tribute training data, and use malicious data to mistrain the network. Our
focus is an MLaaS/distributed training setting [20, 21, 8] and only requires
the adversary to be able to control thread scheduling.
Enclave-based trusted execution. We assume an enclave-based trusted
execution environment [40] (TEE) to defeat trivial and conventional poisoning
attacks. Embodied by Intel’s SGX [24], these TEEs have seen significant
adoption in securing user-level applications across domains [57, 77, 78]. Our
deployment of A-SGD with enclaves is similar to Panoply [78] or Chiron [19],
and only requires the different enclave threads be able to share memory, which
SGX currently supports.
The closest SGX-related work to our attack is AsyncShock [79], which
uses thread scheduling to turn synchronization bugs into integrity attacks on
enclave applications. Relative to AsyncShock, our attack does not exploit
application bugs, and shows how an important class of applications, even
bug-free, are still susceptible to integrity attacks when protected by enclave-
based TEEs. More importantly, we view a large part of our contribution as
showing how thread scheduling can impact a highly stochastic algorithm like
A-SGD in a controllable way.





This work presents asynchronous poisoning attacks, which corrupt machine
learning model training by pathologically scheduling training worker threads.
We demonstrate both indiscriminate and focused attacks, showing how an
attacker can reduce model accuracy and even bias the model towards a
particular label.
The root cause of this attack is relaxed synchronization; the model updates
during asynchronous SGD. Yet, there are many additional, subtle contributing
factors that make attacks easier to launch. Thus, we believe it is important
for future work to formally study what damage a supervisor-level adversary
can do during training, so as to develop holistic and provable defenses.
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